Introduction {#s0010}
============

In this chapter, we will explore how the legal system is responding to the biggest public health threats of the moment. "Of the moment" may be the key phrase here. We have seen in the previous chapter how disease became associated in the public mind with threats from "outsiders," which led to medically unwarranted quarantines in the 19th and early 20th centuries. After those fears subsided and the Great Influenza Epidemic of 1918 ran its course, the field of public health settled into a sleepy backwater of the law, and the strategy for suppression of disease came to depend more on scientific discoveries such as penicillin and the polio vaccine.

Public health issues re-entered public debate during the 1980s and 1990s when the nation responded to the new disease of HIV/AIDS, which led many states to update old public health codes that had not been changed for decades. Ultimately, law proved less important in fighting the disease than the combination of breakthrough drugs and the engagement of patient communities in education campaigns to stop the spread of the disease.

The twenty-first century, however, has ushered in a profoundly new moment: a break with the past that has propelled public health into the forefront of national security concerns. The events that have produced this change were the (still unsolved) anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, the SARS epidemic of 2003, the swine flu outbreak of 2009, and the Ebola outbreak of 2014--2015.

In sum, two major public health threats loom: the possibility of another bioterrorist attack and the natural emergence of new infectious diseases for which there may be no effective treatment. We will trace how the law has developed in response. First came a concerted effort to generate a new statutory creation: the public health *emergency* law, as an add-on to the pre-existing public health codes of the sort we examined in the last chapter. Later, as new natural diseases emerged and the memory of the anthrax attacks somewhat faded, legal responses tended to focus on travel restrictions and new uses for public health powers.

The story of the current era of public health law is one of reactivity, with changes in law following each new incident of bioterrorism or outbreak. In the same way that generals can be criticized for "fighting the last war," public health officials can be faulted for responses that were more retrospective than visionary. To follow these sequential legal changes, this chapter will tell a chronological story centered in the recent past, beginning with the public health response to the 2001 anthrax attacks. (For analysis of workplace-centered responses and legal consequences, see Chapter 15). Then we will explore the legal issues associated with the scary combination of international travel and lethal pathogens.

Emergency Health Powers Laws {#s0015}
============================

In the wake of the 2001 anthrax attack and the generally heightened fear of terrorist activity after September 11, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) asked the Center for Law and the Public's Health based at Georgetown University Law Center and Johns Hopkins University to develop a new legal framework to address such situations. The result was a Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) that has been adopted in whole or in part by more than 30 states.

The philosophy behind the MSEHPA is that existing public health laws would be inadequate if there were a widespread emergency today. According to one of the authors of MSEHPA, the massive efforts needed to respond to a public health emergency "are possible only through enhanced, expedited powers and access to vast resources. Emergency statutes and regulations are designed to provide such power and resources" (Hodge, 2008). Because state and local agencies continue to play a central role in public health policy and are usually the first responders, the model law was intentionally designed as one for state legislatures, rather than Congress, to adopt.

Definitions of Bioterrorism {#s0020}
===========================

There are multiple definitions of bioterrorism, either from government agencies such as the CDC or found in federal and state laws. They generally include some or all of the following factors:●The intentional use or threat of use of any biological agent to cause harm in a human, animal, plant, or other living organism●The same use or threat of use to degrade the quality of food, air, or the water supply●With the goal of influencing government conduct or policy●With the goal of intimidating or coercing a civilian population. The Most Feared PathogensThe CDC has identified the six most dangerous pathogens that could be used in a bioterrorist attack (see [Table 14-1](#t0010){ref-type="table"} ).Table 14-1The Six Most Dangerous PathogensNameDescriptionSymptomsTreatmentAnthrax (excluding cutaneous)Transmission by inhaling; kills 85% of those infected often within 1--3 daysFever and fatigue; progresses to chest pain, cough, rapid declineAntibiotics (cipro) before symptoms appear; vaccine not widely availableSmallpoxPhysical contact with infected fluids or objects or inhalation of droplets; fatal in 30% of unvaccinated patientsFever, aches, vomiting; rash develops into pustulesNo treatment, but vaccine within 4 days after exposure may mitigatePneumonic plagueAirborne; almost 100% fatality rate if untreatedFever, headache, bloody cough; progresses to respiratory failure and deathAntibiotics within 48 hours of exposureViral hemorrhagic feversViruses spread by mosquitoes, rodents, and ticks; Ebola death rate up to 90%, Dengue rate 1%Some variance include fever, aches, exhaustion, internal bleedingAntiviral treatments vary for the specific formBotulismTransmission by inhaling, could be aerosolized; too few cases to know fatality rateToxin blocks nerve signals and muscle movement; paralysis; inability to swallowVentilator; antitoxin given quickly may stop progressionTularemiaInhaling or contact with contaminated substances; could be aerosolized; overall mortality low but untreated severe cases from 30--60% fatalitiesFever, headaches, chills, infection of eyes, skin, mucosal tissueAntibiotics usually successful in naturally occurring cases*Source:* CDC, Gostin, 2003.[Table 14-2](#t0015){ref-type="table"} lists events throughout history that involved biological weaponry and bioterrorism.Table 14-2Select Historical Events Involving Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism\<1000 c. BCScythian archers tipped arrows with blood, manure, and tissue from dead bodies5th c. BCAssyrians poisoned enemy wells with rye ergot (*Claviceps purpurea)*, a fungus containing mycotoxins590 BCAthenians poisoned enemy water supplies with hellebore, an herb purgative, during the Siege of Krissa3rd c. BCPersian, Greek, and Roman Literature describe the use of dead animals being used to contaminate enemy water supplies184 BCCarthaginian General Hannibal ordered his sailors to hurl clay pots filled with poisonous snakes onto the decks of enemy ships during a naval battle. Hannibal won the battle1155Emperor Barbarossa poisons wells with decomposing human bodies1346Tartur army catapulted deceased bodies of plague victims over city walls during the siege of Caffa1495Spanish sell wine mixed with the blood of lepers to their enemies1763British distribute variola virus contaminated blankets to Native Americans resulting in a smallpox outbreak1797Napoleon floods fields around Mantua to promote malaria1915--18Germans attempt to infect Allied horses with anthrax and glanders1932--45Japanese operate Unit 731 in Manchuria conducting experiments that included infecting prisoners with a variety of lethal pathogens1942British test anthrax bombs on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland1950--69US and USSR grow offensive biological weapons programs1969US President Nixon ends the US offensive biological weapons program1972US and USSR sign the Biological Weapons Convention agreeing an end to offensive programs1978Assassination of Bulgarian exile, Georgi Markov in London with an injected ricin pellet1979Accidental anthrax release from a secret Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk kills 661984In the Dalles, Oregon, the Rajneeshee cult contaminated local salad bars with salmonella sickening more than 750 people1990Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult unsuccessfully attempt botulinum toxin releases in Tokyo1991US troops receive anthrax vaccinations1991After the first Gulf War, UN inspectors begin inspections of biological weapons capability in Iraq. Iraqi government officials confirm they had researched the use of anthrax and botulism1993Aum Shinrikyo cult unsuccessfully attempts a second botulinum toxin attack on the wedding of the Crown Prince. Later the same month they unsuccessfully attempted to release anthrax from a Tokyo high rise2001Anthrax contaminated letters mailed to US Senate offices and media outlets sickening 22 and killing five2004Ricin sent to US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist's office

The Anthrax Attacks of 2001 {#s0025}
===========================

"...\[O\]n 4 October 2001, health officials in Florida announced that Robert Stevens, a tabloid photo editor at American Media, Inc. (AMI), had been diagnosed with pulmonary anthrax---the first such case in the United States in almost 25 years. Initially, the patient's condition was attributed to a natural source. However, after two of the victim's co-workers fell ill and anthrax spores were discovered throughout the building in which they worked, these initial assessments soon gave way to apprehension. Other cases began to appear at media outlets in New York City. These new cases revealed the possible source of the exposure: almost all of those infected in New York had come into direct contact with letters containing a mysterious powder.In mid-October, the crisis reached Washington, DC, when an anthrax-laden letter was opened in the office of Senator Tom Daschle. Several workers at the postal facility that processed the letter fell ill with pulmonary anthrax. Congressional office buildings were evacuated and virtually all federal government mail delivery in the nation's capital was halted as a result. An additional letter, addressed to Senator Patrick Leahy, was found during a search of quarantined mail, bringing the total number of anthrax-lade letters sent to at least four. With the realization that these infections stemmed from a deliberate act, what originally started out as public health response increasingly became a law enforcement investigation.By the end of November 2001, ... the outbreak had run its course, and no additional letters were discovered. The results were sobering: a total of 22 people had been infected with either cutaneous or pulmonary anthrax, and 5 of those infected with the pulmonary form died. ...The first bioterrorist attack on the United States in the 21st century is revealing in many respects. The government's response to the attacks proved to a difficult undertaking characterized by a significant amount of on-the-job learning ... From the unconventional delivery mode and conflicting estimates of exposure to questions over the appropriate timing and nature of treatment, government agencies frequently provided substantially different, sometimes contradictory, information and advice to those potentially exposed, to the media, and to the public as a whole. ...\[T\]here were only 18 reported cases \[of pulmonary anthrax\] in the United States between 1900 and 1978, and none through the turn of the century. As a result, very few physicians had any direct experience with anthrax, its identification, and its symptomology. ...\[T\]he initial cases in Florida were initially diagnosed with pneumonia. ...\[A\] large number of hoaxes and false alarms ... followed the actual attacks. Laboratories across the continent were deluged with requests to conduct tests on everything from suspicious-looking white powder to plant seeds to stuffed animals. According to statistics from the CDC, its laboratories and other \[labs\] tested over 125,000 samples during the period following the first reports of the outbreak. In several cases, some state and local laboratories were so overloaded with testing requests that they contemplated setting up triage procedures to prioritize tests. ...A key feature of the public health response to the anthrax letters was the widespread use of antibiotic prophylaxis. Shortly after the contamination at AMI was confirmed, the CDC airlifted enough antibiotics for 1000 people to Florida...With Congress, major television networks and newspapers targets of the attacks, this aspect of the response received considerable attention. The brand name "Cipro" became a household word almost overnight. ...In prescribing antibiotics, the CD identified approximately 10,000 people... as at risk due to potential exposure. However, the number of people on antibiotics extended far beyond the population immediately at risk. At the peak of the outbreak, more than 30,000 people were taking various types of antibiotics. This figure does not include the "worried well" who obtained prescriptions from their private physicians or over the Internet. While specific data are unavailable, some sources of antibiotics reported increases as high as 300--600 percent compared to previous sales. .... \[P\]harmacies in Florida and later in New York reported skyrocketing demands...(Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2002)"

[Fig. 14-1](#f0015){ref-type="fig"} shows an example of a cutaneous anthrax lesion. Figure 14-1A cutaneous anthrax lesion on the neck.Source: Photo courtesy of CDC/Public Health Image Library PHIL ID\# 1934.

The MSEHPA contains some of the same structural components as the National Emergencies Act that we analyzed in Chapter 3 and the Stafford Act that was discussed in Chapters 11 and 12Chapter 11Chapter 12. It establishes the criteria for a formal declaration of emergency, which then triggers an authorization for greater powers in the chief executive (here, the governor) than she or he otherwise has. It spells out what those powers are. And it provides a process for termination or continuation of the state of emergency.

The goal behind MSEHPA is to increase flexibility and adaptability, so that health officials can respond to unexpected crises without unnecessary delay. According to Professor James Hodge:"\[E\]mergency managers, public health practitioners, healthcare workers, volunteers, and other may not be able to fully determine the legality of their actions during emergencies. Some responders may act without significant regard for any legal ramifications; others may choose not to act at all because of this legal uncertainty. Neither of these consequences is acceptable because each has the potential to stymie important public health interventions."

An obvious concern when the government is given greater power is whether there are adequate checks and balances placed on that authority. Georgetown Law Professor Lawrence Gostin, another of the MSEHPA's authors, has identified four principles for limiting the powers of the state even in an emergency:"Agency actions should be (1) necessary to avert a significant risk, in the first instance in the judgment of health officials and ultimately, with reasonable deference \[to the decisions of the health agency\], to the satisfaction of a judge \[who would review the agency's decisions\]; (2) reasonably well-tailored to address the risk, in the sense \[that\] officials do not overreach or go beyond a necessary and appropriate response; (3) authorized in a manner allowing public scrutiny and oversight; and (4) correctable in the event of an unreasonable mistake."

Keep those four principles in mind, and ask yourself as you read portions of the statute below whether you think they have been adequately addressed.Critical ThinkingWhat kinds of specific legal mechanisms might be used to implement Professor Gostin's four principles? Are those mechanisms present in the New Jersey statute below?

Declaring a Public Health Emergency {#s0030}
===================================

The threshold and trigger for everything that follows in MSEHPA is the governor's decision to declare a public health emergency. For that reason, the grounds and process by which the declaration occurs are critically important to the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of later actions.

As an initial matter, one needs to ask, what *is* a public health emergency, such that the state should have additional powers beyond those in the regular public health laws. And when and how should a state of emergency be terminated?

For the sake of convenience, we are going to examine one state's public health emergency law in some detail, because no two states have exactly the same laws. New Jersey adopted an Emergency Health Powers Act (EHPA) in 2005 that is based largely on the MSEHPA. Thus we are going to focus in this chapter on New Jersey statutory law.

The New Jersey EHPA defines "public health emergency" as follows:"\[A\]n occurrence or imminent threat of an occurrence that:(a)is caused or is reasonably believed to be caused by any of the following:(1)bioterrorism or an accidental release of one or more biological agents;(2)the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated biological agent;(3)a natural disaster;(4)a chemical attack or accidental release of toxic chemicals; or(5)a nuclear attack or nuclear accident; and(b)poses a high probability of any of the following harms:(1)a large number of deaths, illness, or injury in the affected population;(2)a large number of serious or long-term impairments in the affected population; or(3)exposure to a biological agent or chemical that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in the affected population.(N.J. Stat. 26:13-2)"

Pause and consider: Does this definition sweep too broadly? Would AIDS, for example, be included? Compare these criteria to the federal government's list of quarantinable communicable diseases in Chapter 13. Do both provisions cover the same diseases? Does it matter if there are differences?

The New Jersey statute says this is about the initiation and termination of a declared public health emergency:(a)The Governor, in consultation with the commissioner and the Director of the State Office of Emergency Management, may declare a public health emergency. In declaring a public health emergency, the Governor shall issue an order that specifies:(1)the nature of the public health emergency;(2)the geographic area subject to the declaration;(3)the conditions that have brought about the public health emergency to the extent known; and(4)the expected duration of the state of public health emergency, if less than 30 days. Such order may also prescribe necessary actions or countermeasures to protect the public's health.(b)Any public health emergency declared pursuant to this act shall be terminated automatically after 30 days unless renewed by the Governor under the same standards and procedures set forth \[above\].

(N.J. Stat. 26:13-3) Critical ThinkingWhich branches of government appear to play no role in the declaration or termination of a public health emergency? What are the arguments for and against a specified role for them? Are there checks and balances against a governor's abuse of power to declare public health emergencies? Can you envision how such a declaration could be challenged? How might a libertarian respond? What would the law's defenders argue in response? ([Table 14-3](#t0020){ref-type="table"} ).Table 14-3Phases of a PandemicPhasePublic Health Goals*Interpandemic Period*Phase 1---No new influenza subtypes have been detected in humans. If present in animals, risk of human infection or disease is considered lowStrengthen preparednessPhase 2---No new influenza subtypes have been detected in humans, but a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human diseaseMinimize risk of transmission to humans; detect and report such transmission rapidly if it occurs*Pandemic Alert Period*Phase 3---Human infections with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread or, at most, rare instances and only to a close contactEnsure rapid characterization of the new virus subtype and early detection, notification, and responsePhase 4---Small clusters with limited human-to-human transmission, but spread is highly localizedContain the new virus within limited foci or delay spread to gain time to implement preparedness measures, including vaccine developmentPhase 5---Larger clusters but human-to-human spread still localizedMaximize efforts to contain or delay spread to possibly avert a pandemic and to gain time to implement pandemic response measures*Pandemic Period*Phase 6---Pandemic---increased and sustained transmission in general populationMinimize the impact of the pandemic sustained transmission in general population*Source*: World Health Organization, Department of Communicable Disease.

The Powers of Government During an Emergency {#s0035}
============================================

The New Jersey law, like the MSEHPA, outlines a number of additional powers that the state government will have during an emergency in a wide variety of areas: mandatory testing and treatment, confidentiality of medical information, the disposal of human remains, seizure of property, and the rationing of medications or vaccines. Some of those topics will come up in later chapters, but for now we are going to concentrate on isolation and quarantine---the two actions that illustrate the most extreme of government's powers: the power to deprive the individual of liberty.

Following are the sections of the New Jersey EHPA that set forth the procedures for isolation and quarantine:New Jersey EHPA Procedures for Isolation and QuarantineThe following isolation and quarantine procedures shall be in effect during a state of public health emergency:(a)The commissioner may exercise, for such period as the state of public health emergency exists, the following emergency powers over persons:(1)to designate, including an individual's home when appropriate, and establish and maintain suitable places of isolation and quarantine;(2)to issue and enforce orders for the isolation or quarantine of individuals subject to the procedures specified in this section; and(3)to require isolation or quarantine of any person by the least restrictive means necessary to protect the public health, subject to the other provisions of this section. All reasonable means shall be taken to prevent the transmission of infection among the isolated or quarantined individuals, as well as among the personnel maintaining and caring for individuals in isolation or quarantine.(b)The following standards shall apply for quarantine or isolation.(1)Persons shall be isolated or quarantined if it is determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the person to be isolated or quarantined poses a risk of transmitting an infectious disease to others. A person's refusal to accept medical examination, vaccination, or treatment ... shall constitute prima facie evidence that the person should be quarantined or isolated.(2)Isolation or quarantine of any person shall be terminated by the commissioner when the person no longer poses a risk of transmitting an infectious disease to others.(c)(1)To the extent possible, the premises in which persons are isolated or quarantined shall be maintained in a safe and hygienic manner, designed to minimize the likelihood of further transmission of infection or other harm to persons subject to isolation or quarantine. Adequate food, clothing, medication, means of communication, other necessities and competent medical care shall be provided.(2)An isolated person shall be confined separately from a quarantined person, unless otherwise determined by the commissioner.(3)The health status of isolated and quarantined persons shall be monitored regularly to determine if their status should change. If a quarantined person subsequently becomes infected or is reasonably believed to have become infected with a contagious or possibly contagious disease, the person shall promptly be moved to isolation. *Remember*: What is the difference between isolation and quarantine? (d)(1)A person subject to isolation or quarantine shall obey the commissioner's orders, shall not go beyond the isolation or quarantine premises, and shall not put himself in contact with any person not subject to isolation or quarantine other than a physician or other health care provider, or person authorized to enter the isolation or quarantine premises by the commissioner.(2)No person, other than a person authorized by the commissioner, may enter the isolation or quarantine premises. Any person entering an isolation or quarantine premises may be isolated or quarantined.(e)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the commissioner shall petition the Superior Court for an order authorizing the isolation or quarantine of a person or groups of persons.(2)A petition pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection shall specify the following:(i)the identity of the person or group of persons, by name or shared characteristics, subject to isolation or quarantine;(ii)the premises designated for isolation or quarantine;(iii)the date and time at which the commissioner requests isolation or quarantine to commence;(iv)the suspected contagious disease, if known;(v)a statement of the terms and conditions of isolation and quarantine;(vi)a statement of the basis upon which isolation or quarantine is justified; and(vii)a statement of what effort, if any, has been made to give notice of the hearing to the person or group of persons to be isolated or quarantined, or the reason supporting the claim that notice should not be required.(3)Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection, before isolating or quarantining a person, the commissioner shall obtain a written order, which may be an ex parte order \[an order issued without the other party being present\], from the Superior Court authorizing such action. The order shall be requested as part of a petition filed in compliance with paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The court shall grant an order upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that isolation or quarantine is warranted pursuant to the provisions of this section. A copy of the authorizing order shall be provided to the person ordered to be isolated or quarantined, along with notification that the person has a right to a hearing pursuant to paragraph (5) of this subsection. Are the procedures set forth in this section an adequate substitute for the requirement of a court order? (4)Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection to the contrary, the commissioner may issue a verbal order, to be followed by a written order requiring the immediate, temporary isolation or quarantine of a person or group of persons, including those persons who have entered an isolation or quarantine premises, without first obtaining an order from the court if the commissioner determines that any delay in the isolation or quarantine of the person would significantly jeopardize the ability to prevent or limit the transmission of infectious or possibly infectious disease to others. The commissioner's written order shall specify:(i)the identity of the person or group of persons, by name or shared characteristics, subject to isolation or quarantine;(ii)the premises designated for isolation or quarantine;(iii)the date and time at which the isolation or quarantine commences;(iv)the suspected contagious disease, if known;(v)a statement of the terms and conditions of isolation and quarantine;(vi)a statement of the basis upon which isolation or quarantine is justified; and(vii)the availability of a hearing to contest the order.The commissioner shall provide notice of the order for isolation or quarantine upon the person or group of persons specified in the order. If the commissioner determines that service of the notice required is impractical because of the number of persons or geographical areas affected, or other good cause, the commissioner shall ensure that the affected persons are fully informed of the order using the best possible means available. A copy of the order shall also be posted in a conspicuous place in the isolation or quarantine premises. Following the issuance of the commissioner's order directing isolation or quarantine, the commissioner shall file a petition pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection as soon as possible, but not later than 72 hours thereafter.(5)The court shall grant a hearing within 72 hours of the filing of a petition when a person has been isolated or quarantined pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) of this subsection. In any proceedings brought for relief under this subsection, the court may extend the time for a hearing upon a showing by the commissioner that extraordinary circumstances exist that justify the extension. ... Contesting the *continuance* of isolation or quarantine. (f)(1)Following a hearing as provided for in paragraph (5) of subsection (e) of this section, on or after a period of time of no less than 10 days but not more than 21 days, as determined by the commissioner based on the generally recognized incubation period of the infectious disease warranting the isolation or quarantine, a person isolated or quarantined pursuant to the provisions of this section may request a court hearing to contest his continued isolation or quarantine. The court may proceed in a summary manner. The hearing shall be held within 72 hours of receipt of the request, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. A request for a hearing shall not act to stay the order of isolation or quarantine. At the hearing, the commissioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that continuation of the isolation or quarantine is warranted because the person poses a significant risk of transmitting a disease to others with serious consequences.(2)A person isolated or quarantined pursuant to the provisions of this section may request at any time a hearing in the Superior Court for injunctive relief regarding his treatment and the terms and conditions of the quarantine or isolation. Upon receiving a request for either type of hearing described in this paragraph, the court shall fix a date for a hearing. The court may proceed in a summary manner. The hearing shall be held no later than 10 days after the receipt of the request by the court. A request for a hearing shall not act to stay the order of isolation or quarantine.(3)If, upon a hearing, the court finds that the isolation or quarantine of the individual is not warranted under the provisions of this section, then the person shall be immediately released from isolation or quarantine. If the court finds that the isolation or quarantine of the person is not in compliance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the court may fashion remedies appropriate to the circumstances of the state of public health emergency and in keeping with the provisions of this section. Contesting the *conditions* under which one is held in isolation or quarantine. (g)...The petitioner shall have the right to be represented by counsel.(N.J. Stat. 26:13-15)(N.J. Stat. 26:13-15) Critical ThinkingWhat are the checks and balances in this section of the statute that will protect individual liberties? How do the types of court hearings authorized in the New Jersey law differ from each other? How long could a person be held with no hearing? As an exercise, diagram the procedures that the Commissioner must follow.

Emerging Infectious Diseases {#s0040}
============================

The University of Iowa's Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases defines the category of \"emerging\" as "infectious diseases whose incidence in humans has increased in the past two decades or threatens to increase in the near future." The National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health offers this explanation of the threat they pose to public health.Despite remarkable advances in medical research and treatments during the 20th century, infectious diseases remain among the leading causes of death worldwide for three reasons: (1) emergence of new infectious diseases; (2) re-emergence of old infectious diseases; and (3) persistence of intractable infectious diseases. Emerging diseases include outbreaks of previously unknown diseases or known diseases whose incidence in humans has significantly increased in the past two decades. Re-emerging diseases are known diseases that have reappeared after a significant decline in incidence. Within the past two decades, innovative research and improved diagnostic and detection methods have revealed a number of previously unknown human pathogens. For example, within the last decade, chronic gastric ulcers, which were formerly thought to be caused by stress or diet, were found to be the result of infection by the bacterium *Helicobacter pylori*.New infectious diseases continue to evolve and "emerge." Changes in human demographics, behavior, land use, etc. are contributing to new disease emergence by changing transmission dynamics to bring people into closer and more frequent contact with pathogens. This may involve exposure to animal or arthropod carriers of disease. Increasing trade in exotic animals for pets and as food sources has contributed to the rise in opportunity for pathogens to jump from animal reservoirs to humans. For example, close contact with exotic rodents imported to the United States as pets was found to be the origin of the recent U.S. outbreak of monkeypox, and use of exotic civet cats for meat in China was found to be the route by which the SARS coronavirus made the transition from animal to human hosts.In addition to the continual discovery of new human pathogens, old infectious disease enemies are "re-emerging." Natural genetic variations, recombinations, and adaptations allow new strains of known pathogens to appear to which the immune system has not been previously exposed and is therefore not primed to recognize (e.g., influenza). Furthermore, human behavior plays an important role in re-emergence. Increased and sometimes imprudent use of antimicrobial drugs and pesticides has led to the development of resistant pathogens, allowing many diseases that were formerly treatable with drugs to make a comeback (e.g., tuberculosis, malaria, nosocomial \[resulting from hospital care\], and food-borne infections). Recently, decreased compliance with vaccination policy has also led to re-emergence of diseases such as measles and pertussis, which were previously under control.

Does the discovery of a new virus always signal the threat of a pandemic? Three characteristics must be met before the situation becomes a public health emergency:●The virus infects humans●There is human-to-human transmission●The virus causes serious disease in humans.

The First Post 9/11 EID: SARS {#s0045}
=============================

The CDC describes SARS as follows:Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus, called SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). SARS was first reported in Asia in February 2003. Over the next few months, the illness spread to more than two dozen countries in North America, South America, Europe, and Asia before the SARS global outbreak of 2003 was contained.According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a total of 8098 people worldwide became sick with SARS during the 2003 outbreak. Of these, 774 died. In the United States, only eight people had laboratory evidence of SARS-CoV infection. All of these people had traveled to other parts of the world with SARS. SARS did not spread more widely in the community in the United States.In general, SARS begins with a high fever (temperature greater than 100.4°F \[\>38.0°C\]). Other symptoms may include headache, an overall feeling of discomfort, and body aches. Some people also have mild respiratory symptoms at the outset. About 10 percent to 20 percent of patients have diarrhea. After 2 to 7 days, SARS patients may develop a dry cough. Most patients develop pneumonia.The main way that SARS seems to spread is by close person-to-person contact. The virus that causes SARS is thought to be transmitted most readily by respiratory droplets (droplet spread) produced when an infected person coughs or sneezes. Droplet spread can happen when droplets from the cough or sneeze of an infected person are propelled a short distance (generally up to 3 feet) through the air and deposited on the mucous membranes of the mouth, nose, or eyes of persons who are nearby. The virus also can spread when a person touches a surface or object contaminated with infectious droplets and then touches his or her mouth, nose, or eye(s). In addition, it is possible that the SARS virus might spread more broadly through the air (airborne spread) or by other ways that are not now known.In the context of SARS, close contact means having cared for or lived with someone with SARS or having direct contact with respiratory secretions or body fluids of a patient with SARS. Examples of close contact include kissing or hugging, sharing eating or drinking utensils, talking to someone within 3 feet, and touching someone directly. Close contact does not include activities like walking by a person or briefly sitting across a waiting room or office.

The SARS Outbreak of 2003: Timeline {#s0050}
===================================

2002---November 16: First known case of SARS is discovered in Guangdong province, China.2003---February 11: The Chinese Ministry of Health reports that there have been 300 cases including five deaths in Guangdong province from an "acute respiratory syndrome" that is consistent with atypical pneumonia.March 11: Hong Kong health officials report an outbreak of an "acute respiratory syndrome" among hospital workers. There are also reports of a severe form of pneumonia among staff at a hospital in Hanoi.March 15: The World Health Organization (WHO) confirms that there is a new "worldwide health threat" and that possible cases have been identified in Canada, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The WHO issues guidelines warning travelers to South East Asia about the dangers of SARS.March 19: The UK, Spain, Germany, and Slovenia report cases.March 27: WHO recommends screening departing travelers from the worst affected areas.March 30: Based on a sharp increase in cases in an apartment complex, the Hong Kong Department of Health issues an isolation order requiring residents of one 35-story building in the complex to remain in their apartments for 10 days. These persons are subsequently moved to rural isolation camps.April 2: WHO recommends postponement of all nonessential travel to Hong Kong and the Guangdong province of China.April 5: China issues an apology for its slow response to the SARS outbreak. The press reports allegations that Chinese officials covered up the true extent of the disease.April 9: First SARS case reported in Africa.April 14: Canadian scientists announce that they have sequenced the genome of the SARS virus.April 16: The WHO announces that a new pathogen, a member of the coronavirus family never before seen in humans, is the cause of SARS.April 17: First SARS case confirmed in India.April 23: WHO recommends postponement of nonessential travel to Toronto. Beijing closes all schools for two weeks.April 26: Health ministers from 13 Asian countries call for all international travelers to be screened for SARS.April 27: Beijing closes all entertainment venues, including movie theaters, cafes, and clubs.May 5: Chinese authorities quarantine 10,000 people in Nanjing.May 15: China threatens to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment on anyone who breaks quarantine orders.May 22: Taiwan reports 65 new cases in one day. More than 150 doctors and nurses have left hospital jobs because of fear of contracting SARS, shutting down or cutting services at nine hospitals.June 13: The WHO withdraws travel warnings for four Chinese provinces, but maintains the warning for Beijing.June 17: WHO lifts its travel warning for Taiwan. Singapore and Vietnam have also been declared SARS-free, after 20 consecutive days without new cases.June 24: Hong Kong and Beijing are removed from the WHO's list of infected areas.July 2: WHO declares that Toronto is SARS-free.July 5: Taiwan is the last country to be removed from the WHO's list of infected areas.September 2003--May 2004: New cases of SARS are reported in Singapore, Taiwan, and China, but there is little spread of the disease.July 2004: The director of China's main disease control agency and the Hong Kong Health Secretary resign after criticism that they failed to adequately report and contain the initial outbreak. Critical ThinkingHow did anthrax and SARS present different legal and management problems for public health officers? What were the best and worst actions taken in each case? What are the bases for your characterizations?

Rationing Medications {#s0055}
=====================

Should an outbreak occur of a highly infectious pathogen---whether it is intentionally caused as part of a bioterrorist attack or a naturally occurring phenomenon such as SARS---there will be great urgency surrounding the issue of distribution of medications or vaccines. Scientists anticipate that if a new strain of influenza takes hold in humans, it will take several months to develop and produce a drug that can counteract it. For anthrax or smallpox, there are pharmaceutical countermeasures available, but the initially available quantities may be inadequate.

States have developed plans to coordinate with federal public health authorities to disseminate "push packs" of existing drugs from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) managed by the CDC. The SNS is a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV administration, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items. Push packs contain pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies designed to provide rapid delivery of medical resources in the early hours of a public health emergency. Push packs are stored in strategically located, secure warehouses, and can be delivered within 12 hours after a state's request. It is then up to state and local health officials to distribute them in the affected areas. If the cause of the disease is quickly identified and there are known medications, the SNS program will arrange shipping of pharmaceutical products specific to that disease.

If there are not enough medications or vaccine available to protect an entire population, enormous ethical and legal questions arise. University of Virginia bioethicist John Arras has summarized the problem as follows:"\[T\]he ethical challenges posed by a possible pandemic ... are nearly as formidable as the scientific and public health challenges. Assuming a high degree of mortality associated with the viral strain, a genuine pandemic would claim millions of lives worldwide and threaten the integrity of key medical, public health, social and political infrastructures. ... In the absence of social consensus on priorities, adhering to fair processes becomes critical for the public legitimation of rationing scare life-saving resources ... \[T\]he rational principles we develop must remain vigilant against the ever-present temptation to discriminate against the poor and dispossessed, whether here at home or in the far reaches of the developing world."

The Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the Director of the CDC prepared a set of ethical guidelines geared to a likely shortage of medications in the event of pandemic influenza. For the allocation of resources, they recommended the following analysis to the CDC.We have concluded that a classic utilitarian approach to defining priorities, "the greatest good for the greatest number," is not a morally adequate platform for pandemic influenza planning. We recommend an approach to ethical justification, that, like utilitarianism, evaluates the rightness or wrongness of actions or policies primarily by their consequences, but, we further recommend that planning should take into account other checks ... grounded in the ethical principles of respect for persons, non-maleficence, and justice. For example, a classic utilitarian approach, which might accept imposing suffering on the few for the greater benefit of all, would be tempered by such principles as:●Refrain from harming or injuring individuals or communities●Equal opportunity to access resources should be assured to those within agreed upon priority groups●Respect for individual autonomy by, for example, employment of the least restrictive interventions that are likely to be effective.Distribution plans should also specify:●What scarce goods are involved in the distribution plan?●Who (or what agency) will decide about prioritization and distribution? A mechanism for authoritative interpretations of the rules in the case of a dispute or an appeal is needed.●Who is eligible to be a recipient? \[e.g., visitors to the local community or only residents?\]●What morally relevant criteria will be employed to assign higher or lower priorities to groups of individuals or individuals within the determined goal (preserving the functioning of society)? For example, are certain key services more essential than others? Within the organization or group of individuals who provide an essential service, are there justified criteria for determining further order of priority (e.g., those with more years of experience or those who have dealt with crises in the past)? ... "...\[I\]n planning for a pandemic where the primary objective is to preserve the function of society, it is necessary to identify certain individuals and groups of persons as "key" to the preservation of society and to accord to them a high priority for the distribution of certain goods such as vaccines and anti-viral drugs. ...Care must be taken to avoid extension of the evaluation of social worth to other attributes that are not morally relevant...." Critical ThinkingWould a first-come, first-served approach be consistent with these ethical guidelines?The CDC prepared a guide to rationing vaccines during a pandemic influenza outbreak (see [Table 14-4](#t0025){ref-type="table"} ). What do you think are the risks of breaching or omitting the ethical principles set out above if this order is followed? Would you change any of the CDC's priority rankings? If so, on what ethical or legal basis?Table 14-4The CDC's Guide to Rationing Vaccines During a PandemicPriority RankGroup to Receive VaccineApproximate Number in Group1-APersons involved in manufacturing and distributing vaccines and antiviral medications; health care workers9 million1-BPersons with multiple influenza high-risk conditions or history of hospitalization for pneumonia or influenza26 million1-CPregnant women and household contacts of infants and of persons who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons10.7 million1-DEssential public health emergency response workers and key government leaders200,0002-AInfants to age 2, adults up to 65 with a single high-risk condition, healthy adults 65 and older59 million2-BRemainder of public health emergency responders and essential workers in public safety, utilities, transportation, and telecommunications8.5 million3Other key government health officials and funeral home workers200,0004Remainder of population179 million*Source*: <http://www.hhs.gov>.

Contemporary Mass Quarantine {#s0060}
============================

Traditionally isolation and quarantine orders have been issued to individuals or, in some cases, to relatively small groups of people (e.g., passengers on a particular ship or flight). Should a pandemic level of transmission be reached, however, public health officials would not be able to catch up by identifying and trying to trace transmission on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, complete enforcement of a mass quarantine order would probably overtax the capacity of local law enforcement.

One lesson that public health agencies learned during the 2003 SARS outbreak was that a menu of large-scale quarantine strategies could be effective. Governments were able to implement a number of social distancing mechanisms, such as cancellation of public events, closure of shopping malls and some public transportation, and other "snow day" measures. Persons who had been exposed to SARS but were not ill were asked to adhere to "home quarantine." Officials also developed the concept of "working quarantine," in which providers of essential services are permitted to work but must observe activity restrictions while off-duty. When schools, workplaces and transportation facilities were not closed, infection control measures included fever screening before entry or the requirement of wearing face masks.

One result of these measures was that realization that quarantine did not have to be mandatory in order to be effective. Voluntary compliance with social distancing measures was greater than 90 percent in most settings (HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2005). However, the financial, social, and psychological impact of such policies was substantial. Moreover, their success required a high degree of cooperation involving not only government officials but also employers, media, and various service providers. (See Chapter 8 for more discussion of the role of the private sector.)

[Fig. 14-2](#f0020){ref-type="fig"} defines the principles of modern quarantine.Critical ThinkingWhen a person is incarcerated, including being placed in a quarantine facility, the government assumes responsibility for providing food, medication, and other necessaries for so long as the incarceration lasts. Would that apply to persons in "home quarantine"? What would the criteria be? If the government does have that duty, how would it be fulfilled? Figure 14-2Principles of modern quarantine.

Travel Restrictions {#s0065}
===================

The rapid transcontinental spread of SARS in 2003 eliminated any doubt that international travel would likely be a major vector of transmission for infectious disease in the future. Some have even speculated that bioterrorists might release a lethal pathogen in airports around the world, making the points of origin extremely difficult to trace and enhancing the odds for rapid dissemination of disease. If one of the characteristics of the disease is that persons who are infected but asymptomatic can transmit the infection, health officials will face major challenges in curbing its spread."During the 2003 global response to SARS, the control strategy for the United States included issuing travel notifications, distributing ... alert notices to travelers arriving from areas with SARS, and conducting visual inspections of arriving travelers...CDC staff met more than 11,000 direct and indirect flights from SARS-affected areas and distributed more than 2.7 million travel health alert notices to arriving passengers as well as to persons arriving at 13 U.S. land border crossings near Toronto and departing passengers bound for the United States from the Toronto airport......CDC quarantine staff \[also\] met planes reporting an ill passenger... If the ill passenger was determined to be a possible SARS case, the locating information was forward to state and local health departments for contact tracing.Border and travel-related activities implemented in countries more seriously affected by SARS included pre-departure temperature and symptom screening, arrival screening, "stop lists" ... of persons who were possible SARS cases or contacts..., quarantine of travelers returning from other SARS-affected areas.(HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2005)"

Based on its experiences with SARS, CDC developed a new set of four levels of advisories to issue to travelers:*In the news---*Notification of an occurrence of a disease of public health significance affecting a geographic area, but no increased risk of disease exposure if standard guidelines are followed.*Outbreak notice*---Notification that a disease outbreak is occurring in a limited geographic area or setting, creating an increased risk for disease exposure but one that is limited to specific settings.*Travel health precaution*---Notification that a disease outbreak of significant scope is occurring in a large geographic area and identifying specific precautions that travelers should take.*Travel health warning*---Notification that a widespread outbreak is expanding outside the area or populations that were initially affected, including the recommendation that nonessential travel be canceled.

(HHS Pandemic Flu Plan, 2005)Critical ThinkingNote that none of the CDC alert levels forbid people from traveling. How effective do you think this advisory approach will be in curbing travel? Can you think of other legal measures that might be used as well?

Ebola {#s0070}
=====

In March 2014, the world learned of an Ebola outbreak that ultimately centered in the West African nations of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease or EVD) is rare and deadly. For persons who are not treated, the mortality rate can reach 80 percent. The 2014--2015 outbreak was the worst recorded to date. It occurred in a part of the world that lacked sufficient supplies of both the equipment needed to protect persons against infection and the medicines necessary to treat those who had been infected. To their credit, thousands of health care workers volunteered to help fight the disease. When those from the United States returned home, however, they often found themselves subject to panic-driven legal responses that were medically unjustified.

EVD spreads by direct contact (through broken skin or mucous membranes) with the bodily fluids---such as blood, urine, stool, semen, or sweat---of a person who is infectious. Those persons who contract the virus become infectious only after they exhibit symptoms, typically consisting of fever, severe headaches, vomiting, diarrhea, extreme weakness, bleeding, or muscle pain. In West Africa, the disease spread rapidly when individuals who lacked basic protective supplies or even knowledge about the disease cared for or participated in burial rites for family members and friends.

The key to proper public health policy is knowing the science behind transmission. Only individuals who have already exhibited symptoms can infect others with the Ebola virus. The risk of transmission is greatest from those in the advanced stages of the disease, when the viral load is highest. Conversely, even someone who has become infected does not pose a risk of transmission until or unless they become symptomatic. The period between infection and symptoms is called the incubation period; for EVD, the maximum incubation time is 21 days. Thus, for someone who has been exposed to the virus and is not symptomatic, it is not possible to know whether an infection has occurred until 21 days after the last possible exposure. And they, in turn, pose a risk to others during those 21 days only after they exhibit symptoms and only if the people around them come into direct contact with their bodily fluids.

The legal and public health response to EVD in the United States became a contest between science and fear as the driving forces for legal interventions. At many points, fear won. The CDC's actions appeared never to get in front of the curve of public opinion, and the agency changed key aspects of its guidelines more than once. State officials from both parties and around the country imposed quarantine orders that went beyond the degree of restriction in even the most stringent policies recommended by the CDC. At federal and state levels, health officials acknowledged that some of their actions were not justified by medicine or science, but were attempts to reassure the public and quell the panic.

First Responses {#s0075}
===============

On March 23, 2014, Guinea reported the EVD outbreak to the World Health Organization (WHO). As the disease rapidly spread in West Africa, governments and NGOs around the world began to provide assistance and also to develop plans for preventing its spread in their own regions and countries. The CDC led the response on behalf of the United States. On July 28, it announced that two American health care workers volunteering in Liberia had been diagnosed with EVD and were being treated. The recommendations portion of the announcement stated:"EVD poses little risk to the U.S. general population at this time. However, U.S. healthcare workers are advised to be alert for signs and symptoms of EVD in patients with compatible illness who have a recent (within 21 days) travel history to countries where the outbreak is occurring, and should consider isolation of those patients meeting these criteria, pending diagnostic testing."

On July 31, CDC elaborated on this advice by characterizing arriving asymptomatic travelers from the affected countries in three groups. Those who had not provided health care to Ebola patients were counseled to self-monitor for symptoms for 21 days after their return. Persons who had worked in a facility or laboratory where Ebola was being treated were advised to engage in active monitoring, i.e., reporting their temperatures and any symptoms to local health authorities for 21 days after their return. For those who had provided direct patient care, CDC recommended direct active monitoring, i.e., twice daily reporting with in-person observation by a health department staffer at least once a day.

The next day CDC issued a diagnostic protocol to be followed by health care providers in the United States.Guidelines for Evaluation of US Patients Suspected of Having Ebola Virus Disease: CDC, August 1, 2014"\...CDC recommends testing for all persons with onset of fever within 21 days of having a high-risk exposure. A high-risk exposure includes any of the following:●percutaneous or mucous membrane exposure or direct skin contact with body fluids of a person with a confirmed or suspected case of EVD without appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE),●laboratory processing of body fluids of suspected or confirmed EVD cases without appropriate PPE or standard biosafety precautions, or●participation in funeral rites or other direct exposure to human remains in the geographic area where the outbreak is occurring without appropriate PPE.For persons with a high-risk exposure but without a fever, testing is recommended only if there are other compatible clinical symptoms present and blood work findings are abnormal or unknown\....Testing is recommended for persons with a low-risk exposure who develop fever with other symptoms and have unknown or abnormal blood work findings. Persons with a low-risk exposure and with fever and abnormal blood work findings in absence of other symptoms are also recommended for testing. Asymptomatic persons with high- or low-risk exposures should be monitored daily for fever and symptoms for 21 days from the last known exposure and evaluated medically at the first indication of illness.Persons with no known exposures listed above but who have fever with other symptoms and abnormal blood work within 21 days of visiting EVD-affected countries should be considered for testing if no other diagnosis is found. Testing may be indicated in the same patients if fever is present with other symptoms and blood work is abnormal or unknown. Consultation with local and state health departments is recommended\...."

Ebola Reaches the United States {#s0080}
===============================

On September 30, the CDC confirmed the first Ebola diagnosis in the United States linked to the West African outbreak. Thomas Eric Duncan, a Liberian man who traveled to Dallas to visit family unaware that he had been infected with EVD, sought care at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, where he was treated for flu-like infection and released. After a resurgence of symptoms, he was returned by ambulance to the hospital, where he was placed in isolation and treated. Tests confirmed the EVD diagnosis.

Duncan died of the disease on October 8. On the same day, the CDC announced that persons traveling from countries with reported EVD cases would be screened upon arrival at five airports where most flights from those countries landed: Kennedy Airport in New York City, Newark Liberty International Airport, Atlanta-Hartsfield, O'Hare Airport in Chicago, and Dulles Airport outside Washington, DC. The screening was to consist of a measure of the individual's temperature, observation by CDC staff for signs of Ebola symptoms, and an interview.

On October 11 and 15, respectively, Nina Pham and Amber Vinson, two staff nurses at Texas Presbyterian who cared for Duncan in the later stages of his illness were diagnosed as EVD-infected. Before learning of her test result, Ms. Vinson had flown round trip from Dallas to Cleveland on October 10 and 14. The CDC and officials in multiple states tracked down the other passengers on her flights and the persons with whom she had contact in Ohio, in order to counsel them and monitor their health status. Both nurses were transferred to hospitals more experienced in treating infectious disease (Emory in Atlanta and the National Institutes of Health), where they were treated and eventually released after testing negative for the virus. None of the passengers on the Cleveland flights or Ms. Vinson's contacts in Cleveland ever exhibited symptoms or tested positive.

Media reporting intensified in mid to late October, as members of Congress and state and local officials called for a ban on travelers arriving in the United States from any country where EVD had been reported. Two cases came to dominate the news.

The Infected Doctor and the Uninfected Nurse {#s0085}
============================================

On October 17, Dr. Craig Spencer, who had volunteered in Guinea and treated EVD patients there, returned to his home in New York City and self-monitored for symptoms by measuring his temperature each day. On October 23, he discovered that he had a fever and was admitted to Bellevue Hospital. CDC confirmed an EVD diagnosis on October 24. (Dr. Spencer recovered and was discharged from Bellevue on November 11.)

Calling CDC's guidance inadequate, Governors Chris Christie of New Jersey and Andrew Cuomo of New York issued their own "additional screening protocols" on October 22:"Each State Department of Health at JFK and Newark Liberty International Airports will, as permitted under applicable law, make its own determination as to hospitalization, quarantine, and other public health interventions for up to 21 days. There will also be a mandatory quarantine for any individual who had direct contact with an individual infected with the Ebola virus while in one of the three West African nations (Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Guinea), including any medical personnel having performed medical services to individuals infected with the Ebola virus. Additionally, all individuals with travel history to the affected regions of West Africa, with no direct contact with an infected person, will be actively monitored by public health officials and, if necessary, quarantined, depending on the facts and circumstances of their particular situation."

In the afternoon of October 24, Kaci Hickox, a nurse who had volunteered to treat Ebola patients in Sierra Leone, returned to the United States on a flight landing at Newark Airport. She was taken immediately to the CDC Quarantine Station located in the airport, where she was interviewed and her temperature taken. Based on her normal temperature and absence of other symptoms, the CDC cleared her for release. New Jersey, however, acted under its own laws to impose quarantine. Hickox was held for three days, first in the airport and then in an isolation room at a nearby hospital, before being driven back to her home in Maine under police escort.

CDC Changes Its Recommendations {#s0090}
===============================

In response to demands for more restrictive measures, the CDC altered both its screening procedures for travelers from the affected countries and its official guidance for state and local health officials. The following October 22 announcement concerned airline passengers, whose flights were now being diverted to the five airports equipped for screening:The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced that public health authorities will begin active post-arrival monitoring of travelers whose travel originates in Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Guinea. \...Active post-arrival monitoring means that travelers without febrile illness or symptoms consistent with Ebola will be followed up daily by state and local health departments for 21 days from the date of their departure from West Africa\....Active post-arrival monitoring is an approach in which state and local health officials maintain daily contact with all travelers from the three affected countries for the entire 21 days following their last possible date of exposure to Ebola virus. Twenty-one days is the longest time it can take from the time a person is infected with Ebola until that person has symptoms of Ebola.Specifically, state and local authorities will require travelers to report the following information daily: their temperature and the presence or absence of other Ebola symptoms such as headache, joint and muscle aches, weakness, diarrhea, vomiting, stomach pain, lack of appetite, or abnormal bleeding; and their intent to travel in-state or out-of-state. In the event a traveler does not report in, state or local public health officials will take immediate steps to locate the individual to ensure that active monitoring continues on a daily basis.In addition, travelers will receive a CARE (Check And Report Ebola) kit at the airport that contains instructions, a thermometer, guidance for how to monitor with thermometer, and information about whom to contact with questions.Active monitoring establishes daily contact between public health officials and travelers from the affected region. In the event a traveler begins to show symptoms, public health officials will implement an isolation and evaluation plan following appropriate protocols to limit exposure, and direct the individual to a local hospital that has been trained to receive potential Ebola patients\....

On October 27, the CDC issued a revised version of "Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus" that reiterated the criteria set forth in the October 22 announcement. An earlier version of the "Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons" issued in August had recommended self-monitoring for most asymptomatic persons who had been exposed to Ebola, with voluntary limits on interaction with others for asymptomatic persons who had higher risk exposures, consistent with the August 1 Guidelines for Patients above.

With its October 22 and 27 statements, CDC's guidance shifted responsibility for monitoring travelers and other potentially exposed people to public health authorities, rather than relying on individuals to monitor themselves. It also established a higher standard of monitoring for health care workers returning from Africa, with its recommendation for direct active monitoring that included daily direct observation by public health officials. In an explanation for the changes posted on its website, CDC acknowledged that it was responding in part to "stakeholder concerns" and demands for banning the entry of travelers from the affected countries and prohibiting normal local movement by exposed but asymptomatic persons.

Federalism, for Better and Worse {#s0095}
================================

As we saw in the prior chapter, American public health law retains its structure of allocating primary legal control to state and local authorities. Federal law authorizes intervention when there is interstate or international travel and risk of transmission, as there certainly was with Ebola, but it is effectively a one-way ratchet. Federal health officials can act when a state has not or cannot impose more stringent restrictions, but it cannot force state authorities to adopt less intrusive measures.

During the Ebola outbreak of 2014-2015, CDC was heavily criticized for ineffective responses and for losing the public's trust. States in which the Governor imposed harsher controls of asymptomatic persons returning from the affected countries than those recommended by CDC included, in addition to New Jersey and New York, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia. CDC conducted its own inventory of state policies ([Fig. 14-3](#f0025){ref-type="fig"} ).Figure 14-3Ebola screening and monitoring policies for asymptomatic individuals.

By contrast, a Maine state court judge ruled on October 31 that state health officials lacked sufficient evidence to justify an order restricting Kaci Hickox's freedom of movement in the community where she lived. Ms. Hickox was cooperating with a direct active monitoring protocol and remained asymptomatic until the end of her 21-day incubation period. In 2015, Ms. Hickox sued New Jersey state officials, alleging that they knowingly violated her rights in detaining her and imposing isolation and quarantine after the CDC screeners had cleared her for release. As this book goes to press, there has been no final resolution of the case.

On March 29, 2016, the WHO terminated its Public Health Emergency of International Concern status for the Ebola outbreak. As of that date, four persons in the United States had been diagnosed with EDV: Mr. Duncan, Dr. Spencer, and the two nurses who treated Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan was the only reported fatality.

Summary {#s0100}
=======

In 2015, Bill Gates told a reporter: "If anything kills over 10 million people in the next few decades, it's most likely to be a highly infectious virus rather than a war." The United States has coped with more serious outbreaks of deadly diseases since 2001 than it did for many years prior to that time. The first, anthrax, was a still unsolved act of bioterrorism. SARS, swine flu, and Ebola Virus Disease had natural causes. In responding to each, the laws and policies utilized by public health officials have evolved.

Important Terms {#s0105}
===============

●Anthrax●Bioterrorism●Ebola Virus Disease●Emerging infectious disease●Push packs●Re-emerging infectious disease●SARS●Social distancing●Strategic National Stockpile●Utilitarianism

Review Questions {#s0110}
================

1.From a legal perspective, what is the difference between bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases?2.What lessons did public health officials learn from the anthrax attacks? From SARS? Ebola?3.Imagine an infectious virus that causes serious medical harm is spread by casual contact (i.e., through the air) and enters the United States when an infected international traveler arrives. Map out the steps that federal and state public health authorities should consider.
